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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANNIE STRINGAM, 
Appellee, 
V. Case No. 20000179-CA 
MORRIS MYERS. ERIN M. STOVALL, 
aka ERIN M. STOVALL, JOHN 
PATRICK STOVALL, 
Defendants/Appellants 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT MORRIS MYERS 
1. Statement of jurisdiction: The Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal by virtue of § 78-2a-3 (2) 
(j), UCA 1953, as amended (1996); the case was transferred to 
the Court of Appeals by Utah Supreme Court ORDER dated April 
12, 2000, "pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code 
Annotated.If 
2. Issue and standard of review: Did the trial court 
commit prejudicial error in denying DEFENDANT MYERS' POST-
TRIAL MOTIONS (r. 865-868, 869-872; 915-916, 917-918; 947-955, 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT MORRIS MYERS POST-TRIAL MOTIONS) for an 
order dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the grounds and for 
the reasons that under the facts and the law she [plaintiff] 
has shown no right to relief, and for plaintiff's failure to 
make the balloon payment of $134,043.24, for an order that the 
Agreement at issue, and all rights of the plaintiff 
thereunder, are forfeited and that defendant Myers is entitled 
to a judgment of forfeiture, as well as for restitution of the 
premises, eviction, damages and quiet title; and whether 
defendant Erin M. Stovall is entitled to any amount under her 
"equitable lien against the American Fork property in the sum 
of one-half of all proceeds received in excess of $109,000,00, 
which lien should become payable upon the sale of the real 
property." (Exh. 54, p. 7; r. 527-533; 550-557) 
Standard of review: The trial court's legal 
determinations are granted no deference. Standard Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride. 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991); 
Threshold question of whether or not the agreement is 
ambiguous is a question of law. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 
(Utah App. 1994); is the agreement to be interpreted as a 
question of law determined by the words of the agreement, or 
a question of fact determined by extrinsic evidence of intent? 
If the language of the agreement is not ambiguous the 
appellate court can review, as a matter of law, the agreement 
under a correctness standard; if the agreement is ambiguous 
and the trial court makes findings of fact, appellate review 
is strictly limited. Copper State Leasing v. Blacker 
Appliancef 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988); A contract provision is 
ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies. Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 
1262 (Utah App. 1994). 
"The Court will disturb the trial court's decision in 
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plaintiff's favor only if its findings are clarly erroneous 
(citations omitted). The clearly erroneous standard requires 
that if the findings are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the 
findings will be set aside (citations omitted). Questions 
about the legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal 
accuracy of the trial court's statements present issues of 
law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness, 
according no deference to the trial court (citations 
omitted).11 State ex rel. C.K.
 r 996 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 2000) 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc. , 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 
1991), a court asked to interpret a contract may first 
inquire as to whether the contract is integrated. Because 
this is a factual determination, review by an appellate court 
is limited. An integrated contract is an agreement where the 
parties thereto adopt a writing or writings is the final and 
complete expression of the agreement. The intent of the 
parties will be enforced. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.f 638 
P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981). If a contract is determined to 
be integrated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of 
terms in addition to those found in the agreement. If the 
contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of 
the agreement. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) 
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3. Statutes, rules, etc* Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b), 
"Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in 
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, 
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon 
an express determination by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Rule 52(a) [Findings by the court*] Effect. In all actions 
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; . . .Findings of fact, whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility the 
witness. * * * 
4» Statement of the case: As a preliminary matter, in 
regards to the appealed ADDENDUM TO FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
dated February 4, 2000, (r. 1021-1026) the trial court entered 
judgment in plaintiff's favor awarding attorney fees in an 
undetermined amount. [A trial court must determine the amount 
of attorney fees awardable to a party before the judgment 
becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3. ProMax Development v. Raile, 998 P.2d 
254 (Utah 2000)] Since the February 4, 2000 ADDENDUM did not 
dispose of the plaintiff's claim for attorney fees, and did 
not contain a special finding under rule 54(b) URCiP it was in 
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all respects interlocutory. Plaintiff's request for attorneys 
fees was in all respects a "claim" for purposes of rule 54(b) 
and, therefore, because the ADDENDUM left the amount of 
attorneys fees undetermined, it did not resolve all the claims 
in the case and was not a final judgment. Home State 
Bank/National Ass'n v. Potokarf 617 N.E. 2d 1302, 1308-1310 
(Ill.App. 1993). Since the ADDENDUM lacked a special finding 
under rule 54(b) it was not subject to enforcement and must be 
reversed. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah App. 
1992). 
A court is without jurisdiction to amend or vacate its 
judgments once final judgment has been entered. Inland Group 
of Companies v. Obendorff, 959 P.2d 454 (Idaho 1998) 
In the case of the appealed FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
dated January 31, 2000 (r. 997-1018), plaintiff Stringam is in 
all respects the "winner." Parties not aggrieved by a 
judgment have no right to appeal therefrom. Poage v. Co-
operative Pub. Co., 66 P.2d 1119 (Idaho 1933). Generally, a 
party may not appeal from a judgment in his favor. Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. U.S. Fidelity Co. , 28 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
1934). 
On April 17, 2000, appellant Myers filed with the Court 
his motion to dismiss appellee's cross-appeal. The Court 
Clerk informed appellant Myers that "the issues raised 
[thereby] are deferred until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case." pursuant to the Court's ORDER 
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DENYING AND DEFERRING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, dated 
and filed June 14, 2000. 
Nature of the case. Stringam and Erin Stovall entered 
into an agreement in writing (Plaintiff's Exh. 1, r. 249-43, 
392-96, 534-37, and 558-61). In a recital to the agreement 
the parties to the agreement declare their desire "of entering 
into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain real 
property at 98 West 500 North, American Fork, Utah,. . ." and 
in a further recital to the agreement state "their intentions 
and agreement as to the entitlement to and distribution of 
profits in the event of sale of said property which is the 
ultimate purpose of this joint venture, . . . " [para. 11 of 
the agreement provides, "[a]t such time as the property is 
sold the net proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as 
follows: A. To payment of the underlying trust deed 
indebtedness. B. The amount of the net proceeds as shall 
exceed $109,000 shall be divided equally between First and 
Second Parties.] 
Paragraphs 9. and 10. respectively, provide "It is agreed 
that time is of the essence of this agreement" and "This 
agreement contains the entire agreement between the parties 
hereto. Any provisions hereof not enforceable under the laws 
of the State of Utah shall not effect the validity of any 
other provisions hereof." 
At the time of the agreement [October, 1990] Erin Stovall 
owned the property; Stringams occupied the property as 
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renters. A further recital to the agreement recites the 
structuring of the joint venture "contemplates the purchase by 
[Stringam] from [Stovall] of said property . . ." The 
Agreement itself [para. 3] provides that [Stringam] agrees to 
pay [Erin Stovall] for the property the purchase price of 
$109,000 on the following terms: $800 each month commencing 
August 1, 1990, for eighty four months, and the entire balance 
remaining shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997; 
interest on principal amounts remaining from time to time 
unpaid shall be at the rate of 11% per annum. * * *,f 
A further recital to the Agreement states, WHEREAS, First 
Party [Stringam] and Second Party fStovalll intend hereby to 
* * ^provide termination and default provisions. 
Paragraph 8. of the agreement provides, 
"Should First Party fail to comply with any of the terms 
hereof, Second Party shall give First Party written notice 
specifically setting forth the provisions under which First 
Party is in default. Should First Party fail to cure such 
default within 30 day [sic] after said notice, Second Party 
may, in addition to any other remedies afforded Second Party 
by law, elect any of the following remedies: 
A. Second Party may be released from all obligations in 
law and equity to convey the property, and First Party shall 
at once become a tenant at will of Second Party. All payments 
which have been made by First Party shall be retained by 
Second Party as liquidated and agreed damages for breach of 
this agreement; * * *" 
On August 8, 1994, Erin Stovall quit-claimed to John 
Patrick Stovall (Def. Exh. 60; r. 204); on August 9, 1994, 
John Patrick Stovall assigned the agreement, Exh. 1, to 
appellant Myers (Exh. 1; r. 208, 239, 392, 523, and 547). By 
Warranty Deed recorded April 22, 1998, John Patrick Stovall 
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conveyed the property to appellant Myers (Def. Exh. 61; r. 
378, 522, and 546) 
The Agreement contained no provision for transfer of 
title to Stringam; quoting the recital again, the parties 
intent was to "enter[] into a joint venture arrangement" 
respecting the real property; interpreted as the parties7 
intent indicates, when Stringam had made the payments required 
the property would become her contribution to the joint 
venture, a separate and distinct legal entity. Salt Lake Knee 
& Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, Kneww & 
Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1995. U.C.A. 1953, 
48-1-3.1(1,2). Stringam materially breached the contract by 
wholly failing, without excuse, to make the balloon payment, 
(r. 1047, tr. 201-203; r. 1048, tr. 186) 
Without paying the balloon payment Stringam eventually 
sued for specific performance and quiet title (r. 265-279, and 
650-664); Myers counterclaimed for restitution, eviction, 
damages and quiet title (PI. Exh. 38; r. 628-631, 641-645). 
In its Final Order and Judgment (r. 997-1018) the trial 
court concluded as a matter of law that 1. The contract 
between the parties is a lease/option to buy. 2. Ms. 
Stringam has a right to tender payment of the final balloon 
payment thereby performing and fulfilling her obligation on 
the contract. 3. The amount of the balloon payment is 
determined to be $141,547.21 as of January 1, 2000. The trial 
court decreed that 1. Once Ms. Stringam tendered the balloon 
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payment the first mortgage (Trust Deed and Note) should be 
satisfied and Mr. Myers shall turn over marketable title to 
Ms. Stringam. 2. One half of all proceeds over the amount of 
$109,000 should be paid to Ms. Stovall in satisfaction of her 
lien/interest in the property, this amount being $16,273.61. 
3. The balance then remaining after paying the Trust Deed and 
Note and Ms. Stovall, should be awarded to Mr. Myers. 4. Due 
to the fact that the parties involved in this dispute 
contributed to or created their own difficulties in this 
matter, each party should pay their own attorneys fees and 
costs, with the exception that Plaintiff's offer of judgment 
in December of 1998 for $150,000.00 if accepted could have 
avoided the necessity of trial. Therefore a portion of costs 
and attorney fees associated with the trial of this matter 
should be awarded to Plaintiff. The Court determines Ms. 
Stringam should receive $12,000.00 of her costs and attorney 
fees, from Defendant Myers. 
Stringam claims to have submitted an application and 
affidavit of attorney's fees requesting $73,574.90 therefore. 
There was no evidence demonstrating reasonableness. Also, 
Stringam did not claim her costs in the manner required by 
rule 54(d)(2), URCiP. 
5. Summary of arguments. The findings of fact of the 
trial judge sitting without a jury shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. In the instant case however, given 
the clear, unambiguous language contained in the Agreement, 
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the findings of the trial judge are against the clear weight 
of the evidence and contrary to the intent of the parties, and 
it is evident that a mistake has been made. Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
6. Argument. Finding of Fact #1 recites that the 
Agreement is a lease/purchase agreement; the first recital to 
the Agreement declares that the parties are "desirous of 
entering into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain 
real property . . ." The recitals to a contract are the 
expression of reasons for the transaction and should be 
considered in determining the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the entire document. Maddux & Sonsf Inc. v. 
Trustees of Arizona Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons, 
Local 395 Health and Welfare Trust Fund, 610 P.2d 477 (Ariz. 
App. 1980) 
Finding of Fact #1 further recites that pursuant to the 
agreement Stringam agrees to make $800.00 monthly payments 
until August 1, 1997, when the balance of the trust deed was 
to become due. To the contrary, paragraph 3. of the 
Agreement, as gleaned from a natural and reasonable 
interpretation of the language used, provides that the balance 
remaining due on the $109,000 purchase price after 84 $800 
payments "shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997."; the 
reference is not to the balance due on a "trust deed." 
Finding of Fact #1 further states, "If Stringam was ever 
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unable to make the payments, she had the option to sell the 
property and divide the equity with Erin Stovall.11 The 
manifest meaning of the language used in the Agreement in its 
entirety is not susceptible of the trial court's quoted 
interpretation which directly conflicts with the intention of 
the parties as stated in the Agreement, paragraph 8 and 8A, ". 
.should first party fail to comply with any of the terms 
[of the Agreement]. . ." 
Finding #1 further finds that "Stringam continued to make 
the payments (which were $800.00 of a $1,3038.00 (?) mortgage 
payment). . ." Paragraph 3. of the agreement explicitly 
states ". . .the purchase price of $109,000 on the following 
terms: $800 each month commencing August 1, 1990, for eighty-
four months. . ." Such finding of the trial court is 
erroneous and supports the appellate court's "definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In Stringam's 
defense, she is relying on the third "whereas" [recital] of 
the agreement that references her conclusion, "which were 
$800.00 of a $1,3038.00 (?) mortgage payment," [When the 
recitals are broader than a contract's operative clauses, the 
recitals cannot be used to extend or broaden the restrictions 
contained in the body of the agreement. Fugate v. Town of 
Paysonf 791 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. App. 1990). 
Finding #45 recites, "Stringam filed Offer of Judgment on 
December 28, 1998, offering $150,000 for which judgment could 
be entered. Defendant would agree to pay costs." The offer 
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is in the record at pp. 568-570. The finding, however, is 
clearly erroneous in that the actual offer at paragraph 5. 
thereof provides, "Defendant agrees to pay costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees accrued to date." This too, would 
support the appellate court's definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake was made; the requirement of payment of 
attorney's fees is not authorized by rule 68(b) URCiP and in 
that payment of attorney's fees was included as a condition of 
the offer, such offer of judgment is invalid. 
In the Discussion and Analysis section of the Final Order 
and Judgment (p. 18) the trial court quotes the wording of 
Erin Stovall's purported equitable lien as follows, "Plaintiff 
is awarded an equitable lien against the American Fork 
property in the sum of one-half of all proceeds received in 
excess of $109,000, which lien should become payable upon the 
sale of the real property." Payment is expressly indexed to 
the time of sale, October, 1990, at which time there was 
$108,200 due on the sale. Therefore, no amount is due Erin 
Stovall by virtue of her equitable lien. 
Conclusion of Law #1, "[t]he contract between the parties 
is a lease/option to buy," is not supported by the unambiguous 
language of the Agreement, is contrary thereto as being in 
conflict with the intention of the parties as expressed and 
contained in said Agreement. 
Conclusion of Law #2, "Ms. Stringam has a right to tender 
payment of the final balloon payment thereby performing and 
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fulfilling her obligation on the contract/1 is an abstract 
statement of a right too broadly accorded, i.e., to give Ms. 
Stringam a right to redeem more than two years after appellant 
Myers had elected and given the notices as provided in 
paragraph 8. A. of the agreement, whereby nonjudicial 
foreclosure had been accomplished. Conclusion of Law #2 
should therefore be stricken as being against law and in that 
it unconstitutionally impugns appellant Myers' right to 
contract. 
Conclusion of Law #3 should also be stricken for the same 
reasons and grounds stated above for striking Conclusion of 
Law #2. 
Paragraph 1. of the trial court's Decree should be 
stricken for the reason that there is no operative provision 
in the Agreement requiring "marketable title" to be "turned 
over" to Ms. Stringam. 
Paragraph 2. of the trial court's Decree should be 
stricken for the reason that payment of Erin Stovall's 
purported equitable lien is specifically indexed to the "time 
of sale" at which time there was less than the threshold 
amount due, viz., $108,200. 
Paragraph 3. of the Decree, "[t]he balance then remaining 
after paying the Trust Deed and Note and Ms. Stovall, should 
be awarded to Morris Myers," should be stricken for the 
reasons stated above for striking Paragraph 2. of the Decree, 
and, as well, from a natural and reasonable interpretation of 
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the entire agreement, the manifest meaning of the language 
used by the parties, it must be concluded that the underlying 
trust deed should only be paid from the proceeds of sale under 
paragraph 11.A. 
Paragraph 4. of the trial court's Decree should be in all 
things stricken with the exception that the beginning two 
lines [to the second coma, line two] should be retained as an 
expression by the trial judge on the record for not awarding 
fees to the prevailing party as required under the provisions 
of subsection (1) Sec. 78-27-56 (1988) and Sec. 78-27-56 (2) 
(b) (1988). The balance of said paragraph 4. of the trial 
court's Decree amounts to an abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial judge for reasons previously stated [the offer of 
judgment mentioned was invalid for its demand for payment of 
attorney's fees to date]. 
7* Conclusion: Quoting Justice Orme in his concurrence 
in Commercial Investment Corp. v. Sigqard. 936 P.2d 1105, 1112 
(Utah App. 1997) "Without paying the [balloon payment] into 
court or even tender ing [$134,043.24], the amount due, 
[Stringam] eventually sued for specific performance. Being in 
material breach of [her] obligations under the contract, 
without excuse and without having tendered its performance, 
[Stringam] simply was not entitled to specific performance of 
the contract. In turn, [appellant Myers was] entitled to have 
his title quieted against [Stringam], which had lost its 
rights under the contract by its long-standing material breach 
14 
and its failure to tender performance.w 
Appellant Myers therefore prays judgment dismissing 
Stringam's cross-appeal; reversing the trial court's FINAL 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT of January 31, 2000, and the ADDENDUM 
thereto dated February 4, 2000, with the exception as stated 
above respecting paragraph 4. of the trial Court's Decree of 
January 31, 2000; and that the matter be remanded to the trial 
court with directions to enter judgment quieting title in 
appellant Myers, as well as for damages in appellant Myers 
favor and against plaintiff Stringam as provided by law. 
A copy of the Agreement sued on is appended hereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATED July 24, 2000. 
L 
MORRIS MYERS, Appellant 
Post Office Box 761 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 801 755 2780 
On July *^ ^  , 2000, two true copies each mailed 
as follows: 
C. Val Morley 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Terry R* Spencer 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
John Patrick Stovall 
1159 East Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84m5_^ 
MORRIS MYERS 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum One, AGREEMENT sued on 
Addendum Two, FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT, January 31, 2000 
Addendum Three, ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, February 
4, 2000 
AGREEMENT 
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT made this 1st day of August, 
1990# by and between Wade and Jeanie Stringham/ of 98 West 500 
North/ American Pork/ Utah 84002/ herein called First Party, 
and Erin M. Stovall/ of 2511 South Chadwick/ Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84106/ herein called Second Party/ WITNESSETH/ that 
WHEREAS/ First and Second Parties are desirous of 
entering into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain 
real property at 98 West 500 North/ American Fork/ Utah/ and 
WHEREAS/ the legal and record title to said property 
is in Second Party and there is presently a trust deed incumbrance 
(ARM) against the property in favor of American Charter/ of Omaha/ 
Nebraska/ upon which there is an approximate balance due of $105/00 
with current monthly payments of $1225; and 
WHEREAS/ First Party presently occupies the property 
and the structuring of this joint venture contemplates the purchase 
by First Party from Second Party of said property for $109/000 with 
deferred payments of $1038 each month commencing August 1/ 1990/ 
and continuing for eighty-four months and that on August 1# 1997/ 
the entire balance remaining unpaid will become due and owing/ 
payments to apply first to interest at the rate of 11% per annum 
and then to principal; said joint venture contemplates that First 
Party shall pay $800 each month to apply against the $1038. payment 
and Second Party shall pay the difference; and 
WHEREAS, First Party and Second Party intend hereby to 
state their intentions and agreement as to the entitlement to 
and distribution of profits in the event of sale of said property 
which is the ultimate purpose of this joint venture, and to 
provide termination and default provisions; 
NOW, THEREFORE, First Party and Second Party agree 
as follows: 
1. Second Party agrees to sell and First Party agrees, 
to buy said real property;. 
2. First Party to have possession as of August 1, 1990, 
3. First Party agrees to pay Second Party for the property 
the purchase price of $109,000 on the following terms: $800 each 
month commencing August 1, 1990, for eighty-four months, and the* 
entire balance remaining shall be due and payable on August 1, 1997i 
interest on principal amounts remaining from time to time unpaid 
shall be at the rate of 11% per annum. As aforestated, the total 
monthly payment for eighty-four months is $1038 but of that amount 
Second Party shall pay $328 and shall also be responsible to pay 
for and maintain fire and extended insurance coverages on said 
property. 
4. Second Party agrees to pay taxes and assessments 
which become due on said property. 
5. First Party agrees that it will neither commit nor 
suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or 
upon said property, and that First Party will maintain the property 
in good condition. 
6. The parties agree that should either party default 
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the prevail-
ing party in litigation shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this contract, or in obtaining 
possession of the property, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by applicable law. 
7. This agreement is binding on the heirs, executorsf 
administrators, personal representatives, successors or assigns 
of the respective parties hereto. 
8. Should FIRST PARTY fail to comply with any of the 
terms hereof, SECOND PARTY shall give FIRST PARTY written notice 
specifically setting forth the provisions under which FIRST PARTY 
is in default. Should FIRST PARTY fail to cure such default 
within 30 day after said notice, SECOND PARTY may, in addition to 
any other remedies afforded SECOND PARTY by law, elect any of the 
following remedies; 
A. SECOND PARTY may be released from all obligations 
in law and equity to convey the property, and FIRST PARTY shall 
at once become a tenant at will of SECOND PARTY. All payments 
which have been made by FIRST PARTY theretofore under this 
agreement shall be retained by SECOND PARTY as liquidated and 
agreed damages for breach of this agreement; provided, however, 
that should payments of principal exceed 20% of the purchase 
price plus SECOND PARTY'S accrued interest, fair rental value, 
and a reasonable attorney's fees, then and in that event, FMch 
excess shall be refunded to FIRST PARTY. This remedy shalx ue 
available to SECOND PARTY from and after the time FIRST PARTY 
shall have paid to SECOND PARTY 33 1/3% or more of the $109,000 
purchase price. 
B. SECOND PARTY may bring suit and recover judgment 
for all delinquent installments and all reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, and the use of this remedy on one or more 
occasions shall not prevent SECOND PARTY, at SECOND PARTY'S 
option, from resorting to this or any other available remedy in 
the case of subsequent default; or 
C. SECOND PARTY may, upon written notice to FIRST 
PARTY, declare the entire balance and accrued interest 
hereunder at once due and payable and may elect to treat this 
agreement as a note secured by a deed of trust, without 
requirement of tender of legal title to FIRST PARTY, proceed 
immediately to foreclosure in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah applicable to trust deeds. 
9. It is agreed that time is of the essence of 
this agreement. 
10. This agreement contains the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto. Any provisions hereof not 
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not 
effect the validity of any other provisions hereof* 
11. At such time as the property is sold the net 
proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as follows: 
A. To payment of the underlying trust deed 
indebtedness. 
B. The amount of the net proceeds as shall exceed 
$109,000 shall be divided equally between First and Second 
Parties. 
C. The amount of equity as determined by resort to 
standard mortgage payback or amortization schedule (amount, 
$109,000; amount of payment, $1038; annual interest rate, ll%f 
payment frequency, monthly) shall be paid 77% to First Party 
and 23% to Second Party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF First And Second Parties have 
hereunto affixed their hands and seals the day and year first 
above written. 
FIRST PARTY 
SECOND PARTY 
ASSIGNMENT OF AGREEMENT 
The undersigned John Patrick Stovall, the owner and holder 
of the within agreement, for valuable consideration receipt where-
of is acknowledged by said John Patrick Stovall, assignor, hereby 
and by these presents, does assign and transfer the said agreement, 
together with the real property described therein, to Morris Myers, 
Post Office Box 761, Nidvale, Utah 84047. 
DATED August 9, 1994. 
JOHN PATRICK STOVALL 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CASAlft b £.\«TH. Cicrk 
"Trey" A.R. Dayes, III, Bar no. 7504 
C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801)785-0853 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
STRINGAM, JEANNE, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. 
MYERS, MORRIS et al ] 
Defendants. ] 
) FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
l Case No. 9704000100 
i Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on May 20, 1999 and June 28, 1999. 
The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel C. Val Morley, and 'Trey" A.R. Dayes III 
Defendant, Morris Myers represented himself, as did Defendant John Patrick Stovall, Erin M. Stovall 
was represented by counsel Terry R. Spencer. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties 
and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file, tape of the proceedings and 
exhibits, and upon being advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Complaint was filed on February 3,1997, by Plaintiff, Jeannie Stringam. On October 8,1990, 
Stringam entered into a real property lease/purchase agreement with Erin Stovall (then married to 
Patrick Stovall). In this agreement Stringam agreed to make $800.00 monthly payments until August 
1, 1997, when the balance of the trust deed note was to become due. If Stringam was ever unable 
to make the payments, she had the option to sell the property and divide the equity with Erin Stovall. 
Erin Stovall later transferred her interest in the property to John Patrick Stovall in a divorce 
settlement, reserving one-half interest in the proceeds above $109,000.00 from the sale of the home. 
John Stovall later transferred his interest to Morris Myers. Stringam continued to make the payments 
(which were $800.00 of a $1,3038.00 mortgage payment) until October 22, 1996, when Stringam's 
counsel mailed a letter to Myers offering to pay the outstanding balance of the trust deed note in full. 
Defendant, Myers claims he is not required to allow the Plaintiff to refinance the property and 
that he is entitled to one-half of the equity of the property upon completion of the terms of the 
agreement. This is in contradiction-of the agreement, which contemplated such a division only if 
Stringam sold the property before the end of the term of the agreement. 
Stringam asked the Court for (1) Specific Performance, requiring Myers to accept the 
tender payment in full of the outstanding balance of the trust deed note, (2) Declaratory Judgment 
that Stringam may seek refinancing and pay the balance of the trust deed note without incurring any 
penalty, or dividing equity with Myers; (3) Quiet Title requiring Myers to cooperate in transferring 
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title to Stringam. 
2. Myers filed Answer on February 25, 1997. He denied every allegation in the Complaint and 
listed three Counterclaims. He claims the parties entered into a joint venture and that he was 
damaged in the amount of $100,000.00. He claims that the joint venture was formed for the purpose 
of selling the property to a third person and distributing the proceeds according to the terms of the 
agreements. He also claims that by refusing to sell the property to a third person, Stringam is 
violating the fiduciary relationship that exists between the parities. 
3. Stringam filed Motion to Strike Answer and Counterclaim on March 5, 1997. 
4. Myers, represented by Larry L. Whyte, filed a Motion to Leave to Amend answer and 
Counterclaim on March 20, 1997 The parties later stipulated to allow Myers to file his Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim. 
5. Stringam filed Answer and Counterclaim on April, 29, 1997. 
6. Stringam filed Motion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance into 
Court. Stringam asked to tender $104,000.00 to the Court since the deadline for the payment 
was approaching and counsel for Myers was not authorized to sign a stipulation for substitute 
performance. Stringam was concerned that Myers would not honor the agreement and accept 
the funds, hence the tender to the Court before the deadline of August 1, 1997. 
7. Myers filed Objection to Motion to Allow Substitute Performance on August 18, 1997. 
Myers claimed the offer to tender was vague, untimely, and not for the full amount due and 
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owing, but did not indicate a balance he believed was owning 
8 Stringam file Response to the Objection on September 24, 1997 Stringam's offer was 
timely and was made to keep Myers from claiming she had defaulted on the loan Furthermore, 
under UCA§ 78-27-1, a written offer is deemed to be an actual production and tender of the 
payment if the defendant refuses to accept the offer 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written 
instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual 
production and tender of the money, instrument or property 
9 Oral arguments were held on October 1, 1997, before Judge Eyre, who found that 
Stnngam had attempted to make a tender offer She was ordered to tender $109,000 00 to the 
Court by October 7, 1997 Myers could petition the Court to withdraw the money to make the 
payments on the underlying trust deed The Defendant would be responsible for the underlying 
trust deed payments 
10 Stringam filed Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender 
Title into Court on October 16, 1999 Stringam argued that she deposited the funds into Court, 
but Myers did not provide any indicia that he had clear title to the property Stringam asked the 
Court to order title be transferred to Stringam and allow Myers to receive a trust deed in the 
property to protect his interest in any additional amounts the Court may determine Myers in 
entitled to receive 
11 Myers filed Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief on 
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October 31, 1997. Myers claimed the amount due to him is $134,000.00, not $109,000.00. 
Further it is argued that Stringam did not tender this amount to the Court and is now in default. 
12. Stringam filed a reply to the Memo in Opposition for Expedited Declaratory Relief on 
November 6, 1997. Stringam paid $109,000.00 into the Court, which was addressed by the 
Court. Myers never established his right to the funds and has not yet furnished proof of his ability 
to provide Stringam with clear title. Furthermore, the amount of the balloon payment is one of 
the grounds of litigation. The agreement was so unclear that it required judicial interpretation as 
to how to compute the balance due. Myers drafted the agreement in question. [[[Though Myers 
claimed that Stringam admitted $134,000.00 was the amount owed, Stringam's position is that 
she admitted she would be willing to tender this amount if he would give her clear title He has 
never shown he can give title, and Stringam has not agreed that this is the proper amount due.]]] 
13. The parties came before the Court on December 1, 1997. Stringam was allowed to 
withdraw her funds from the Court. She was ordered to pay $32.84 per day in interest from 
August 1, 1997 through the day she-withdraws the money. Stringam was also ordered to pay the 
full mortgage amount of $1,038.00. (Mr. Morley drafted the Order and changed the interest 
payment to $50.00.) 
14. Erin Stovall filed Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order and 
Request for Fees on March 9, 1997. Erin moved for a protective order that her deposition not be 
has on the grounds that she is a resident of Salt Lake and has been subpoenaed to appear in Utah 
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County. She claimed this is necessary to protect her from undue burden and expense. 
15. Stringam filed Motion to Amend Complaint on March 10, 1998. During the course of 
discovery Stringam learned that Erin and Patrick Stovall still have an interest in the property. 
Erin filed a Notion of Lis Pendens on October 22, 1997. 
16. Myers filed Motion for Summary Judgment on March 13, 1998. The Summary Judgment 
stated that Stingam had not paid the balloon payment, she had defaulted and therefore, summary 
judgment was appropriate for Myers. Myers claimed Stringam defaulted by not paying the flinds 
on August 1, 1997. Myers then sent her a letter advising her she was in default and gave her 30 
days to tender payment. Myers then claimed that after several letters between counsel, Stringam 
filed the Motion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance. In actuality, 
Stringam filed the Motion to Allow Substitute Performance in July, several days before the 
August 1 deadline. Stringam filed this Motion because she was concerned that Myers would not 
accept the payments she was making. In addition, Stringam asked the Court to determine what 
the balloon payment should be because Myers either didn't tell her, or named an amount that 
seemed high and couldn't be reconciled with the agreement. 
17. Stringam filed Memo in Opposition to Erin StovalPs Motion to Quash Subpoena on 
March 16, 1998. Stringam claimed service was proper, and that since Erin conducted business in 
Utah County, her appearance in Utah County is proper. 
18. Motion to Quash is Granted and Order is entered on March 16, 1998. She was also 
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awarded attorney fees and costs in the sum of $200.00. 
19. The Order on Stringam's Motion to Amend Complaint was signed on March 20, 1998. 
20. Stringam file Amended Complaint on March 10, 19998 naming Erin and John Patrick 
Stovall. 
21. Myers filed Objection to Motion and Amend Complaint on March 25, 1998. Myers 
claimed the Stovalls have no interest and allowing them to be added will only cause undue delay 
and prejudice. 
22. Stringam file Rule 56(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery prior to being required 
to file a memo in opposition to Myer's Motion for Summary Judgment. Stringam asserted that 
through Myers claimed he sent Notice of Default to Stringam regarding the balloon payment, 
neither she not her counsel received it. Stringam pointed out there were numerous issues of 
material fact in dispute, including some required additional discovery. 
23. On May 4, 1998, Morris Myers submitted notice that Larry Whyte would no longer be 
representing him and the he would be-representing himself 
24. Larry Whyte submits Notice of Withdraw of Counsel on May 4 , 1998. Myers also filed 
Notice of Withdraw of Summary Judgment on May 4, 1998. 
25. Myers filed Answer to Stringam's Amended Complaint on May 8 ,1998. Myers denied 
each and every allegation and claimed Stringam forfeited any right to interest she has in the 
property by failing to make the balloon payment. He also claimed he is the only person with any 
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interest in the property. 
26. A Default Certificate was entered in error on May 18, 1998, against Erin Stoval for failing 
to answer the Complaint. 
27. Erin Stovall filed an Answer on May 14, 1998. 
28. Myers filed Answer to Amended Complaint on June 28, 1998, with two Counterclaims. 
He sues for Quiet Title against Stringam because she hasn't yet paid the balloon payment. And he 
sues for eviction and damages, claiming she is unlawful detainer of the property. He also cross-
claims for declaratory relief against Erin Stovall for the lis pendens action. 
29. Stringam filed Objection to Filing of and Motion to Strike Myers 2nd Amended Answer on 
July 14, 1998. Myers had already answered the Amended Complaint on May 8, 1998. He cannot 
file an Amended Answer without leave of Court. 
30. Myers filed Reply to the Objection to Filing of and Motion to Strike on July 28, 1998. 
The Order allowing the Amended Complaint was signed before there was an opportunity for 
hearing on the amended complaint and "therefore the same is void as in violation of the 14th 
Amendment Due Process right to an 'meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" Bodie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971). Myers then moved the Court for an order vacating the March Order. 
He also claims the amended Complaint is a procedural nonentity, making the Answer a nonentity 
as well. 
31. John Patrick Stovall filed Answer to Amended Complaint on September 14, 1998. 
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32. Morris Myers and Patrick Stovall filed Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on September 
22, 1998, contending that the balloon payment was due but was not paid, and this was a material 
breach. 
33. The parties appeared before Judge Eyre on October 7, 1998. The parties stipulated to 
allow Myers to amend his answer and counterclaim, and the Court denied the Motion to Strike. 
Trial was set for February 9-10, 1999. 
34. Stringam filed Answer to John Patrick Stovall's Counterclaims on October 2, 1998. 
35. Erin Stovall filed Response to the Motion for Summary judgement on October 5, 1998. 
She did not object to summary judgment being entered as long as her interest is not damaged. 
36. Stringam filed a Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery in Order to Supplement 
her Opposition to the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. Myers and Stovall had not provided 
documents showing how and when Stovall's interest in the property was transferred to Myers. 
There are factual issues precluding Summary Judgment. 
37. Notice to Submit on Joint Motion for Summary judgment is filed on October 16, 1998. 
38. The Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery was Granted by the Court on 
October 26, 1998 in Memorandum Decision. Stringam has until December 1, 1998 to file a 
responsive pleading. At that time either party could file a Notice to Submit the Motion for 
Decision. 
39. Order on Stringam's Motion to Strike Myer's Amended Answer is signed by the Court on 
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November 12, 1998. The parties stipulated to allow Myers to file his amended Answer. The 
Court agreed that this would be the final amended Answer and Counterclaim to be filed. 
40. Stringam filed Supplemental Memo in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
on December 1, 1998. Stringam lists several factual issues. The nature of the agreement is in 
dispute: (1) the text of the agreement does not reflect that is was a join venture agreement. It was 
a real estate purchase agreement between Erin Stovall and the Stringams. (2) Myers has not 
produced an assignment from Erin Stovall. (3) Myers has produced an alleged assignment and 
deed from John Patrick Stovall, but there is an issue of fact as to whether or not he is the owner 
of the agreement or has any rights, since the divorce decree gives Erin the right to V2 of all 
amounts received from the home over $109,000.00. 
A second factual issue related to the balloon payment amount. Stringam claims she owes 
$109,000.00, Myers claims $134,000.00. The language in the contract is ambiguous. Neither 
Stovall nor Myers were parties to the agreement. There is no evidence that Erin transferred her 
interest to Patrick Stovall. Furthermore, any statement from Myers regarding the parties' original 
intent are not admissible because he was not present. Finally, even Patrick Stovall cannot provide 
a payoff amount. He did admit that Myers drafted the original agreement, so any ambiguities 
should be construed against Myers. 
The final factual issue concerns the balloon payment. In spite of Myer's claims that 
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Stringam defaulted, she did tender the funds to the Court and she asked to do this several days 
before it was necessary. 
41. Stringam filed Motions to Compel against Patrick Stovall and Myers on December 21, 
1998. The motion against Myers specifically targets paragraph 14 of his allegation that he has 
been responsible for the payment of $238.00 of the mortgage. Stringam asks that judgment by 
default be entered against Myers and that he be prohibited from introducing evidence regarding 
paragraph 14 unless he responds to the interrogatories within 10 days of the Order. 
42. Myers filed Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 22, 1998. Myers 
claimed that Stringam has conducted discovery in a manner to harass, inconvenience and injure 
Myers. He rests on the argument that Stringam is in default and has not paid the balloon payment 
that is owed. 
43. Stringam filed Motion for Summary Judgment against Morris Myers on December 24, 
1998. Stringam argued that Myers may not assert greater right than was granted to him by 
Patrick Stovall. Myers claims he received his right to the property from Patrick Stovall. Thus 
any right he had to the property is no greater than the right Patrick Stovall had. Stringam asks for 
Summary Judgment that Myer's right is no greater than the right granted by Patrick Stovall. 
44. Stringam filed Motion for Summary Judgment against John Patrick Stovall on December 
24, 1998. Stringam argues that any interest Mr. Stovall has was assigned to Myers. 
45. Stringam filed Offer of Judgment on December 28, 1998, offering $150,000 for which 
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judgment could be entered. Defendant would agree to pay costs. 
46. Myers filed Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 18, 1998. He 
relies on the argument that Stringam failed to pay the balloon payment and is in default. He also 
argues contract law, i.e. that a court may not rewrite a term of a contract by interpretation when 
the meaning is clear. He claims the agreement concerning the balloon payment was clear and 
unambiguous. 
47. Stringam files Replies to Myers' and StovalPs Opposition to the Motions to Compel. 
Myers complains that the requests are abusive, harassing and inconvenient, nevertheless Stringam 
has made only one request for interrogatories that was calculated to discover admissible evidence. 
The objection is without sufficient grounds. The request are proper. Stringam questions what 
legal right Myers has to the property in question, what other reasons Myers is alleging the he has 
in support of his counterclaim and what evidence he has that he has been making the mortgage 
payments. 
48. Counsel for Erin Stovall filed*Motion to Continue on January 25, 1999, asking that the 
dates be continued because he is a Utah State Senator and cannot prepare or attend pre-trial 
conferences for the trial. The Court later granted the Motion and charged that the trial dates to 
April 4, 1999. 
49. Myers filed Application to the Clerk for Certification of Default pursuant to Rule 55 (d), 
claiming Stringam failed to reply to his Counterclaims. 
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50. Myers' Certificate of Default was entered on February 2, 1999. 
51. Stringam filed Request for Ruling on her Motions for Summary Judgment against Myers 
and Stovall and Motions to Compel against Myers and Stovall. 
52. Stringam filed Motion to Set Aside Default on March 24, 1999. Stringam argued that 
when Myers fourth amended answer was filed, she had asked in her objection that she would be 
relieved of any obligation to answer the pleading, since the issues had already been answered 
before. The understanding of Laramie Merritt, who was in oral arguments, was that Stringam 
was not to file additional pleadings after the amended answer Furthermore, the allegations in the 
counterclaim have been answered. In addition, Rule 5(a)(1) requires every paper, motion, notice, 
etc. be served on all parties. Myers was not relieved of that duty until "after the entry of default." 
Myers should have served Stringam. Stringam has shown more than good cause for setting the 
entry of default aside. 
53. Stringam filed Answer to the Amended Answer and Counterclaim on March 24, 1999. 
Myers filed Memo in Opposition andObjection to the Motion to Set Aside Default on March 29 
,1999. Myers argued there is no showing of just cause for opening the default nor reasonable 
excuse for Plaintiffs failure to reply to his counterclaim. He argued further that Stringam had not 
tendered the balloon payment, not substantially complied with the agreement. 
54. The parties appeared before the Court on March 31, 1999. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgement concerning Mr. Stovall was granted. Summary Judgement concerning Mr. 
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Myers, and Mr. Myers Motion for Summary Judgement were taken under advisement. 
55. The Court entered a Memorandum Decision on April 12, 1999, where Plaintiffs Motion 
to Set Aside was granted. The summary Judgement concerning Mr. Myers, and Mr. Meyers 
Motion for Summary Judgement were denied. 
56. Stringam filed a Notice of Intent to Use Prior Criminal Convictions for Impeachment 
Purposes on April 23, 1999. 
57. Myers filed a Motion to Strike and Vacate the Ruling of October 28, 1997, on June 23, 
1999, claiming that he was denied due process. Myers argued the discrepancy between the 
$109,000 determined by the court, and $134,000 the alleged correct figure, amounted to the 
Court rewriting the terms of the agreement. 
Stringam filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Myer's Motion to Strike, on July 8, 1999. 
Stringham asserted that Myers' due process rights were not violated because he did have notice, 
and order was not in error. 
58. The case came before the Court for trial on June 28, 1999. Counsel for Erin M. Stovall 
submitted Closing Arguments on July 2, 1999. Counsel for Jeannie Stringham submitted Closing 
Arguments and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on July 19, 1999. Myers never submitted Closing 
Arguments. 
59. Myers submitted his Post-trial Motions and supporting memorandum on July 15, 1999. 
Myers asserts that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because she has shown no right to 
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relief Further Myers moves the court for an order striking the testimony of Plaintiffs expert 
(accountant), claiming that the parties intent is the best evidence to establish the terms of the 
contract, and that the contact is not ambiguous. Myers further moves the Court for an order that 
said contact and all rights of the plaintiff thereunder, are forfeited since she didn't make the 
balloon payment. Myers asks that the evidence and testimony as to his embezzlement conviction 
be stricken, as it illustrates no criminal conduct or mortal turpitude, while being prejudicial. 
Finally Myers asks for an order releasing the copy of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to him. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Myers' Post-trial Motions was filed July 29, 1999. 
Myers' Reply was submitted on August 10, 1999. 
60. Plaintiffs response to Erin M. Stovall's Closing Arguments were filed on August 4, 1999. 
61. Plaintiffs Counsel submitted a Request for Ruling on August 23, 1999. 
The Court entered a Ruling as to Myers Post-trial Motions on September 8, 1999. The Court 
denied Myers' Motion to Dismiss the claim as unsupported. The Court denied Myers' request for 
an Order striking the testimony of Plaintiff s expert witness. The Court also refused to find that 
Plaintiffs rights has been forfeited under the contract. Furthermore, the Court denied 
Defendant's Motions to find that Plaintiff did not tender the balloon payment, and motion to 
strike the evidence as to his embezzlement convictions. The Court granted Myers' request for the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be released to himself. Finally the Court denied the Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate the Order of October 28, 1997. Myers still filed no Closing Arguments a 
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requested by the Court, but has appealed rulings on motions, rather than waiting for final ruling 
and judgement. 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
At issue in this case is whether the agreement entered into between the parties constituted 
a joint venture or a lease/option to buy. Testimony was presented at trial that Ms. Stringam, and 
Ms. Stovall, believed the agreement to be a lease/option to buy. Mr. Myers and Mr. Stovall 
assert that the agreement was a joint venture. Mr. Myers drafted the agreement and therefore, 
according to case law ambiguities should be construed against Mr. Myers. Trolley Square Assoc. 
v. Nelson 886 P 2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The fact that ambiguities are interpreted against the 
drafter's interests, supports the position that this contract is a lease/option to buy. 
Likewise, the language of the contact supports the position that the contact is a lease/option to 
buy. "Second party agrees to sell and First Party agrees to buy said real property". This language 
taken on its face seems to indicate a lease/option to buy. Finally, Ms. Stovall who has no interest 
in the interpretation of the agreement, also believed the contact to be a lease/option to buy. The 
language of the contact, and the intention and actions of the parties, establish that the agreement 
was to lease/option to buy. 
Being a lease/option to buy contract, Ms. Stringam has the right to purchase the property 
herself by paying the balloon payment. The Court finds Ms. Stringam is not in default for failing 
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to make the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam attempted numerous times to try to ascertain the 
amount required for the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam went further and made offers to 
Defendant Myers for the balloon payment. Myers continually avoided the Plaintiff and refused to 
let her perform her obligation under the agreement. According to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-1; 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or 
specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and 
tender of the money, instrument or property. 
Myers cannot frustrate an attempt by Stringam to perform and then fault her for failing to 
perform. Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and should not be imposed where Defendant's own acts 
caused delays. Plaintiff began well ahead of the due date to ascertain the balloon amount, 
therefore Ms. Stringam has the right to make balloon and perform on the contract. 
The balloon payment amount has been the subject of much controversy. Defendant has 
made assertions that the calculation for the balloon payment was one that anyone could do. 
Defendant testified he failed to give them a sum foe the balloon payment and stated "....Well, I 
thought you could compute it yourself. Trial transcript June 28, 1999 pg 49 line 14. Contrary 
to Mr. Myers' testimony it appears that even he himself had difficulty determining the sum. The 
numbers quoted in documents submitted to the court, varied with at least four differing sums 
named. The Court has established that the sum is ambiguous and evidence and expert testimony 
regarding the calculation was proper. The calculation for the balloon payment is further 
complicated by the nature of the agreement, that of a lease/option to buy with negative 
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amortization. Jude Eyre determined the payment to be a minium of $109,000 in the order on 
October 28, 1997. Mr. Myers asserts that taking into account the negative amortization, the true 
payment is $134,618.57. Plaintiff argue the balloon payment should be set at $104,211.75. 
Plaintiff support this assertion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an 
objection "... is to the amount of money, terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of 
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from 
objection afterwards". Plaintiff contend that since Ms. Stringam made a valid legal tender offer of 
$104,211.75, and that Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of money required in his objection. 
Since he did not specify the amount Plaintiff argues he is bound by the amount of PlaintifTs tender 
offer. 
Regarding Ms. StovalPs interest in the property, the Court earlier ruled through summary 
judgement that the interest Mr. Stovall had in the property was assigned to Morris Myers. 
However through the divorce decree of Mr. And Mrs. Stovall, Mrs. Stovall retained an interest in 
the property constituting Vi of all proceeds received for the property over $109,000. "...Plaintiff 
is awarded an equitable lein against the American Fork property in the sum of one-half of all 
proceeds received in excess of $109,000, which lein should become payable upon the sale of the 
real property". Therefore if the amount of the balloon payment is over $109,000 there is the issue 
of whether Mrs. Stovall has an interest in Vi of those proceeds. Mr. Myers has asserted that the 
amount of the balloon payment should be $134,618.57. Mr. Myers asserts that Ms. Stovall has 
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no interest in the amount of the proceeds received above $109,000, in that the true selling amount 
is $109,000, and the amount above that equal to $134,618.57 is simply the interest resulting from 
the negative amortization. It is consistent that any amount over the selling price due to interest 
accrued as a result of the negative amortization, still constitutes proceeds of the sale. Therefore 
Ms. Stovall is entitled to Vi of the balloon payment amount over $109,000. 
Plaintiffs expert witness, an accountant offered another sum computed from his 
understanding of the contract terms and the added another element of the negative amortization. 
Based on his interpretation, the Court determines the balloon payment to be $134,043.24, as of 
August 1, 1997. Plaintiff continued to pay $800.00 per month until December 1997, when she 
began paying $ 1038.00 per month. Plaintiffs pay off as of January 1, 2000 is $141,547.21 under 
the agreement $32,547.21 represents proceeds in excess of $109,000, one half of these proceeds 
should be awarded to Ms. Stovall, or $16,273.61. The first mortgage (trust deed and note) 
should be satisfied first from the $141,547.21, then Ms. StovalPs award of $ 16,273.61, and the 
balance remaining should be awarded'to Morris Myers. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The contract between the parties is a lease/option to buy. 
2. Ms. Stringam has a right to tender payment of the final balloon payment thereby 
performing and fulfilling her obligation on the contract. 
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3. The amount of the balloon payment is determined to be $141,547 21, as of January 1, 
2000. 
THE COURT HEREBY DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Once Ms. Stringam has tendered the balloon payment the first mortgage (Trust Deed and 
Note) should be satisfied and Mr. Myers shall turn over marketable title to Ms Stringam. 
2. One-half of all proceeds over the amount of $109,000 should be paid tp Ms. Stovall in 
satisfaction of her lien/interest in the property, this amount being $16,273.61. 
3. The balance then remaining after paying the Trust Deed and Note and Ms. Stovall, should 
be awarded to Morris Myers. 
4. Due to the fact that the parties involved in this dispute contributed to or created their own 
difficulties in this matter, each party should pay their own attorneys fees and costs, with the 
exception that Plaintiffs offer of judgement in December of 1998 for $150,000.00 if accepted 
could have avoided the necessity of trial. Therefore a portion of costs and attorney fees 
associated with the trial of this matter should be awarded to Plaintiff. The Court determines Ms. 
Stringam should receive $12,000.00 of her costs and attorney fees, from Defendant Myers. 
DATED at Provo, Utah ft^^l^/, 2*0Z> 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Terry R Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall 
Attorney for Defendant, Defendants Pro Se 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for respondent will submit the above and 
foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the for signature upon the expiration of five (5) 
days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed 
prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this '*' day of / K^'CCC olt q , 2000. 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P C 
/ 
c^ 4TREV>JE£1}AYES HI 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this {,>' "day of January, 
2000, to the following: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Morris Myers 
P.O. Box 761 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
John Patrick Stovall 
1159 East Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
22 
C ValMorley,BarNo. 6942 
"Trey" A.R. Dayes III, Bar No. 7504 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. B--l\"0Q 
Attorneys for Jeannie Stringam 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo. Utah 84601 
JEANNIE STRINGAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MORRIS MYERS, ERIN M. STOVALL, 
aka ERIN M. BISNER STOVALL, JOHN 
PATRICK STOVALL, 
Defendants. 
ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 970400100 
Judge' Guy R. Burningham 
After discussion in chambers^vith counsel C. Val Morley on behalf of the Plaintiff, Terry 
R. Spencer on behalf of Erin Stovall appearing via telephone, and Defendant Morris Myers pro se 
appearing via telephone, for purposes of clarification the Court adds and clarifies its Findings, and 
Final Judgment and Order as follows: 
L The ambiguity created by the negative amortization terms of the contract at issue, 
left the Court with the responsibility to determine the correct amount of the final balloon payment. 
Plaintiff argued that the balloon payment amount should be set at $104,211.74 citing Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an objection "...is to the amount of money, terms of the 
instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which 
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards." Plaintiff asserts that since Ms. Stringam 
made a valid legal tender offer of $ 104,211.74 , and Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of 
money required in his objection, he is bound by the amount of Plaintiffs tender offer. 
When this matter came before the Court, Mr. Myers claimed that Ms. Stringam didn't 
make the balloon payment and therefore made no tender. The Court finds that Ms. Stringam 
attempted to tender payment by the deadline specified in the contract and the Court gives Ms. 
Stringam the benefit of her proffered tender and its timeliness. Furthermore although Mr. Myers 
objected to the tender, he failed to specify the nature of his objection. Mr. Myers objection to the 
tender failed to state an amount, said amount being in dispute. Therefore the Court finds that Mr. 
Myers is precluded from objecting to the propriety of the tender because he failed to specify the 
amount necessary to make tender sufficient. 
However, the amount of the tender was inadequate, with Ms. Stringam offering tender of 
an amount clearly insufficient. There is no waiver where a full tender is not made. Therefore, Mr. 
Myers is precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3 from making the claim that Ms. Stringam 
made no tender, but Ms. Stringam is precluded from binding Mr. Myers to the tendered amount 
where that amount and her fulfillment of the contract is in dispute. 
2. The Court finds the prevailing party in this litigation has a right to attorneys fees 
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pursuant to paragraph six of the Agreement (Exhibit A) between the parties which states in 
pertinent part: 
The parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained the prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise ro 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this contract or in obtaining possession of the 
property in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this ligation and 
therefore has a right to attorneys fees and costs from December 21, 1998, the date Plaintiff 
extended to Myers her offer of judgment. 
FINAL JUDGMENT ADDENDUM 
It is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. The amount of the Balloon payment shall remain $ 141,547.21. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys fees from December 21, 1998. 
3. Within 30 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff shall pay $ 141,547.21 to the 
"Title Company" of her choosing with instructions to the Title Company to disburse the $ 
141,547.21 as follows: 
a. To Terry R. Spencer in trust for Erin Stovall in the amount of $ 16,273.61. 
b. To the underlying mortgage holder on the property, payment in full of the 
underlying mortgage as per lender's payoff amount. 
c. Duval Hansen Witt & Morley, P.C. in trust for Plaintiff, attorneys fees 
from December 21, 1998. 
d. To Morris Myers the remainder of funds. 
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4. After payment of $ 141,547.21 to the Title Company, disbursement of funds by the 
Title Company, and the filing with the Court of an Aifidavit by the Title Company stating that 
funds have been distributed according to this order, title to the property at 98 West 500 North 
American Fork, Utah also know as: 
COM. SW COR BLK 52, Plat A, American Fork City SR; N 110 Ft; E 138 FT; S 
110 FT; W 138 FT to BEG, 
shall be quieted in Plaintiff Jeannie Stringam 
5. And it is further ordered that Plaintiffs judgment shall be augmented in the amount 
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise, or still owed after disbursement of funds, as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED: /5fZ3 ^ , Tj&Q-t) . 
niy K. tfurningar 
Fourth District Court JudgeC 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Terry R. Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall 
Attorney for Defendant, Defendant Pro Se 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff will submit the 
above and foregoing ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the Court for 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) day from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED / h e / V Q . 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, PC. 
^ T R E Y ' ^ A J ^ 5 f ^ E S i n 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTD7ICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on [ 7 0 1 0 0 _ I caused a true and correct copy of this 
ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, to be mailed via first class to: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Morris Myers 
P.O. Box 761 
Midvale,Utah 84047 
John Patrick Stovall 
1159 East Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
ORLEY, PC. 
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August 1, 2000 AUG 0 3 2000 
Utah Court of Appeals COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
RE: Stringam v. Myers, 
Case No. 20000179-CA, citation of supplemental authority, 
Utah R.App.P. 24(i) 
From the case of BA Mortg. & Intern. Realty v. American Nat. Bank, 
706 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. 111. 1989), the following should be 
included after the first paragraph under the heading Nature of the 
Case, Brief of Appellant, p. 6, [BA Mortg., 706 F.Supp, page 1371], 
"A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to 
carry out a single enterprise for profit. . . . The 
relationship between joint venturers, like that existing 
between partners, is fiduciary in character and imposes upon 
the participants an obligation of loyalty and good faith in 
their dealings with each other with respect to the enterprise. 
. . . The relationship is governed by the legal principles to 
partnerships. 
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. . . [T]he attributes that determine the existence of 
the jural relationship [are], 
11
 (1) an express or implied agreement to carry on some 
enterprise; (2) a manifestation of intent by the parties to be 
associated as joint venturers; (3) a joint interest as shown 
by the contribution of property, financial resources, effort, 
skill or knowledge by each joint venturer; (4) some degree of 
joint proprietorship or mutual right to exercise control over 
the enterprise; and (5) provision for the joint sharing of 
profits and losses. 
"The existence of a joint venture may be inferred from facts 
and circumstances showing such an enterprise was in fact 
entered into . . . and the intent of the parties is the most 
significant element. 
"Whether or not a joint venture exists is a question for the 
trier of fact as he is in the best position to judge the 
credibility of the witness. 
"In this instance it is unnecessary to go beyond "*the most 
significant element7": the intent of the parties. Here the 
[Agreement] specifically provides []: "'Whereas, First and 
Second Parties are desirous of entering into a joint venture 
arrangement respecting certain real property at 98 West 500 
North, American Fork, Utah, . . .'" 
The case [citation] is submitted because it contains 
definitional terms relevant to the case before the Court. 
cc: Morley 
Spencer 
Enc: Seven 
